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Abstract. Secret handshake allows a group of authorized users to es-
tablish a shared secret key and at the same time authenticate each other
anonymously. A straightforward approach to design an unlinkable secret
handshake protocol is to use either long-term certificate or one-time cer-
tificate provided by a trusted authority. However, how to detect the mis-
using of certificates by an insider adversary is a challenging security issue
when using those approaches for unlinkable secret handshake. In this pa-
per, we propose a novel k-time authenticated secret handshake (k-ASH)
protocol where each authorized user is only allowed to use the credential
for k times. We formalize security models, including session key secu-
rity and anonymity, for k-ASH, and prove the security of the proposed
protocol under some computational problems which are proved hard in
the generic bilinear group model. The proposed protocol also achieved
public traceability property if a user misuses the k-time credential.
Keywords: Unlinkable Secret Handshake, Insider Adversary, k-time Au-
thentication, Public Traceability, Generic Bilinear Group Model
1 Introduction
Secret handshake is a useful cryptographic primitive and has been extensively
studied in the literature. It allows an authorized user to share a secret key with
others without revealing their real identities. The following scenario can clarify
its practicality. A FBI agent wants to contact with another agent, and both
of them do not want to disclose their identity information during interaction.
The only information they need to know is the peer belongs to the same agent
system. There have been two types of unlinkable secret handshake system in the
literature: one is based on the long-term certificate (e.g., [14, 15]), and the other
is based on one-time certificate (e.g., [16]). In the former type, the authorized
user generates the shared secret value using the secret long-term certificate given
by a trusted authority (TA) of the organization. In the latter type, the long-term
secret value will be replaced by a set of one-time certificates and the authorized
user will use one of them for unlinkable secret handshake in each session.
For the long-term certificate, an authorized user is allowed to reuse the given
certificate when establishing a secret value with another authorized user. For
example, the given secret certificate is blended with Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
in order to generate a secret key with forward secrecy (e.g., [14, 15]). Since the
same certificate is used everytime, how to ensure the unlinkability is the major
challenge in the protocol design. On the other hand, the one-time certificate
approach (e.g., [16]) can address the unlinkability easily since each certificate is
supposed to be used only once. Nevertheless, none of the previous approaches
has considered the issue of misusing of certificates. We should note that for the
one-time certificate schemes, the user is supposed to use each certificate once.
However, reusing the given one-time certificates is a security issue that has not
been formally considered in the previous works.
We give an example where misusing of the certificates (or credentials) should
be prevented in secret handshake in some scenarios. Suppose there are n players
subscribed to a real-time gaming system. Each user will obtain a set of k creden-
tials from the game server after paying a subscription fee that is proportional
to k. The players can form ad-hoc groups to play the game and a player can
join a gaming session using one credential at a time. In order to ensure that
only registered players are eligible to communicate with the peers, the players
should generate a common session key to protect the communication. Also, it is
desirable that the players cannot recognize each other except the fact that they
are all legitimate subscribers of the system. Therefore, we may use a multi-party
secret handshake protocol to achieve the security and privacy goals. However,
in this example, a malicious player may try to reuse his credentials to continue
playing the game without topping up extra money after all the credentials are
used up. Therefore, it is important to identify such cheating players who reuse
their one-time credentials. However, we found that the misusing of credentials
has not been formally addressed in the previous secret handshake schemes. In
this paper, we focus on addressing the credential misusing problem under the
one-time certificate setting, and leave the task of designing such a scheme under
the long-term certificate setting as our future work.
1.1 This work
In this paper, we introduce the notion of k-time authenticated secret handshake
(k-ASH), allowing all authorized users in a system to agree on a common se-
cret value anonymously while preventing them from misusing their credentials
issued by a trusted party of the system. Our contributions can be summarized
as follows:
1. We present the formal security definition for k-time ASH protocol. In par-
ticular, we extend the eCK model [21] to define session key security and a
variant of Juels-Weis privacy model [17] to define user anonymity.
2. We present a new unlinkable k-time ASH using anonymized Schnorr signature
[22] and tag bases [25] to trace the cheating users who reuse their one-time
credentials.
3. We prove a variant of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (VoCDH)
and an extension of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
(EVoDCBDH) [27] in the generic bilinear group model, and prove the security
of the new k-time ASH protocol under these assumptions.
1.2 Related work
Key Exchange. Bellare and Rogaway [6] introduced the first complexity-
theoretic security model for key exchange under the symmetric-key setting. The
model was later extended and enhanced under different contexts [7, 2, 5]. Canetti
and Krawczyk [11] later refined the previous models and proposed a new model,
known as the CK model, which is widely used in the analysis of many well-known
key exchange protocols. Some variants [20, 21] of CK model were also proposed
to allow an adversary to obtain either long-term secret key or ephemeral se-
cret key of the challenge session. Burmester and Desmedt [10] (BD) introduced
several key exchange protocols in the multi-party setting, including star-based,
broadcast-based, tree-based, and cyclic-based protocols. Later, a few generic
transformations [19, 18, 8] were proposed to convert passive-secure group key
exchange protocols into active-secure ones.
Secret Handshakes. Balfanz et al [1] introduced the concept of secret hand-
shake that allows any users in the same group to generate a shared value secretly
using the long-term certificate approach. Afterwards, Castelluccia et al [12] con-
structed a more efficient scheme than [1] under the standard Computational
Diffie-Hellman Assumption. But both schemes did not provide the unlinkability
property. In [26], Xu and Yung provided an unlinkable scheme but with weaker
anonymity, named k-unlinkability, which means in the worst case, an adversary
can infer that a participant is one out of certain k users. For achieving the full
anonymity, Jarecki et al [16] proposed two group secret handshake protocols us-
ing the BD group key agreement protocol (e.g., [10]). In particular, the second
construction in [16] used one-time certificate to achieve full anonymity under
the Gap Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Meanwhile, several secret handshake pro-
tocols have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [14, 15]) which achieved full
anonymity without using one-time certificate. The protocol in [15] and the im-
provement protocol in [14] are long-time certificate based, and both of them are
allowed to reuse the given certificate with unlimited number of times.
2 Security Model
In this section, we present the security models for k-ASH. As mentioned in the
introduction, a secure k-ASH protocol should achieve both session key security
and anonymity. Below we present the corresponding security models to capture
the above requirements. Specifically, the session key security model is a modified
version of eCK model [21], which is an extension of CK model [11] in the secret
handshake setting, while the anonymity model is extended from the privacy
models ([17, 24]) for RFID authentication protocols.
States. We define a system user set U with n users, i.e. |U| = n. We say an
oracle ΠiU may be used or unused. The oracle is considered as unused if it has
never been initialized. Each unused oracle ΠiU can be initialized with a secret
key x. The oracle is initialized as soon as it becomes part of a group. After
the initialization the oracle is marked as used and turns into the stand-by state
where it waits for an invocation to execute a protocol operation. Upon receiving
such invocation the oracle ΠiU learns its partner identifier pid
i
U and turns into
a processing state where it sends, receives and processes messages according to
the description of the protocol. During that stage, the internal state information
stateiU is maintained by the oracle. The oracle Π
i
U remains in the processing state
until it collects enough information to compute the session key KiU . As soon as
KiU is computed Π
i
U accepts and terminates the protocol execution meaning
that it would not send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails
then ΠiU terminates without having accepted.
Partnering. We denote the i-th session established by a user U by ΠiU , and
identities of all the users recognized by ΠiU during the execution of that session
by pidiU . We define sid
i
U as the unique session identifier belonging to the session
i established by the user U . Specifically, sidiU = {mj}nj=1, where mj ∈ {0, 1}∗ is
the message transcript among users. We say two instance oracles ΠiU and Π
j
U ′
are partners if and only if pidiU = pid
j
U ′ and sid
i
U = sid
j
U ′ .
2.1 System Model
We define a k-time authenticated secret handshake protocol consists of the fol-
lowing algorithms:
– Setup: The algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input, outputs the
master public parameters mpk (including the k-time tag bases) and the master
secret keys msk.
– KeyGen: The algorithm takes the master public key mpk as input, outputs a
public/secret key pair (X,x).
– Register: This is an interactive algorithm that executed between the user and
the TA. TA takes the master secret key msk and a public key X of one user
as input, outputs a set of credentials {si}ki=1 on X. The user will become a
registered user after interaction with TA.
– Handshake: This is an interactive algorithm that executed by registered users.
Each user takes his/her secret key x, one of his/her credentials {si}ki=1 and
mpk as input, outputs a shared secret key K if and only if his/her counterparts
are registered users.
– Tracing: The algorithm takes two handshake transcripts of one user and one
of tag bases as input, outputs the user’s public key X.
2.2 Session Key Security
We define the session key security model for k-ASH protocols, in which each user
obtains a set of credentials associated with his/her public key from the TA, and
establishes a session key using one of the given secret credentials in one session.
The model is defined via a game between a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A and a simulator S. A is an active attacker with full control of the
communication channel among all the users.
– Setup: S first generates master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk) for the TA
and long-term secret keys {xi}ni=1 for n users by running the corresponding
KeyGen algorithms, where xi denotes the secret key of user i. In addition, S
generates a set of secret credentials {si,j}kj=1 for user i by running the Register
algorithm. S also tosses a random coin b which will be used later in the game.
Let U denote all the registered users.
– Training: A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to simulator
S.
• Establish: A is allowed to register a user U ′ with public key X ′i. If a user is
registered by A, then we call this user dishonest ; Otherwise, it is honest.
• Send: If A issues send query in the form of (U, i,m) to simulate a network
message for the i-th session of user U , then S would simulate the reaction
of instance oracle ΠiU upon receiving message m, and returns to A the
response that ΠiU would generate; If A issues send query in the form of
(U,′ start′), then S creates a new instance oracle ΠiU and returns to A the
first protocol message.
• Session key reveal: A can issue reveal query to an accepted instance oracle
ΠiU . If the session is accepted, then S will return the session key to A;
Otherwise, a special symbol ‘⊥’ is returned to A.
• Ephemeral secret key reveal: If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal
query to (possibly unaccepted) instance oracle ΠiU , then S will return all
ephemeral secret values contained in ΠiU at the moment the query is asked.
• long term secret key reveal: If A issues a long term secret key reveal (or
corrupt, for short) query to user i, then S will return both the long term
secret key and the secret credential set (xi, {si,j}kj=1) to A.
• Master secret key reveal: If A issues a master secret key reveal query to TA,
then S will return the master secret keys msk to A.
• Test: This query can only be made to an accepted and fresh (as defined
below) session i of a user U . Then S does the following:
∗ If the coin b = 1, S returns the real session key to the adversary;
∗ Otherwise, a random session key is drawn from the session key space and
returned to the adversary.
Note that A can generate a set of secret credentials {si,j}kj=1 of user i after
issuing Master secret key reveal query to TA. It is also worth noting that A
can continue to issue other queries after the Test query. However, the test
session must maintain fresh throughout the entire game.
Finally, A outputs b′ as its guess for b. If b′ = b, then the simulator outputs
1; Otherwise, the simulator outputs 0.
Freshness. We say an accepted instance oracle ΠiU is fresh if A does not perform
any of the following actions during the game:
– A issues Session key reveal query to ΠiU or its accepted partnered instance
oracle ΠjU ′ ;
– A issues both Long term secret key reveal query to U ′ s.t. U ′ ∈ pidiU and
Ephemeral secret key reveal query for an instance ΠjU ′ partnered with Π
i
U ;
– A issues Long term secret key reveal query to user U ′ s.t. U ′ ∈ pidiU prior to the
acceptance of instance ΠiU and there exists no instance oracle Π
j
U ′ partnered
with ΠiU .
Note that the Master key reveal query to TA is equivalent to the Long term
secret key reveal to all users in pidiU .
We define the advantage of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvA(λ) = Pr[S → 1]− 1/2. (1)
Definition 1. We say a k-ASH protocol has session key security if for any PPT
A, AdvA(λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
2.3 Anonymity
Informally, an adversary is not allowed to identify who are the handshake users,
with the condition that honest users authenticate with each other within k times.
We define a game between an insider adversary A and a simulator S as follows:
– Setup: S generates master public/secret key pairs (mpk,msk) for the TA and
long term secret keys {xi}ni=1 for n users by running the corresponding KeyGen
algorithms. In addition, S generates a set of secret credentials {si,j}kj=1 for
user i by running the Register algorithm. S also tosses a random coin b which
will be used later in the game. We denote the original n users set as U .
– Training: A is allowed to issue Establish, Send, Ephemeral secret key reveal,
Session key reveal and at most n-2 Long term secret key reveal queries to S. We
denote the honest (i.e., uncorrupted) user set as U ′.
– Challenge: A randomly selects two users Ui, Uj ∈ U ′ as challenge candidates,
then S remove them from U ′ and simulates U∗b to A by either U∗b = Ui if b = 1
or U∗b = Uj if b = 0.
Let A interact with U∗b . Note that A is allowed to activate at most k sessions
for Ui, Uj throughout the entire game.
A ⇔ U∗b =
{
Ui b = 1
Uj b = 0
Finally, A outputs b′ as its guess for b. If b′ = b, then the simulator outputs
1; Otherwise, the simulator outputs 0.
We define the advantage of A in the above game as
AdvA(λ) = Pr[S → 1]− 1/2. (2)
Definition 2. We say a k-ASH protocol has anonymity if for any PPT A,
AdvA(λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
3 Our Construction
3.1 Preliminaries
Bilinear Map. The bilinear map ê : G×G→ G1 has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(gαi , gαj ) = ê(g, g)αi·αj : ∀αi, αj ∈ Zq, g ∈ G.
2. Non-degeneracy: ê(g, g) 6= 1.
3. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm for computing the bilinear
map.
Note that the map ê is symmetric since ê(gαi , gαj ) = ê(g, g)αi·αj = ê(gαj , gαi).
3.2 Modified Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Definition 3. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption [20]:
Given g, ga, gb ∈ G where a, b ∈R Zq, we define the advantage of the adversary
in solving the CDH problem as
AdvCDHA (λ) = Pr[A(g, ga, gb) = gab ∈ G]
We say a CDH assumption holds in group G if for any PPT A, AdvA(λ) is a
negligible function of the security parameter λ.
We propose a variant of computational diffie-hellman problem (VoCDH) below.
Definition 4. Given g, ga, g1/a, gb ∈ G where a, b ∈R Zq, we define the advan-
tage of the adversary in solving the VoCDH problem as
AdvV oCDHA (λ) = Pr[A(g, ga, g1/a, gb) = gab ∈ G]
We prove the above VoCDH problem is hard in G with a bilinear map ê : G×G→
G1 in the generic bilinear group model [23, 9].
Theorem 1. Let ε1, ε2 : Fp → {0, 1}∗ be two random encodings (injective func-
tions) where Fp is a prime field and G = {ε1(a)|a ∈ Fp},G1 = {ε2(a)|a ∈ Fp}.
If a, b are uniformly and independently chosen from Fp and encodings ε1, ε2 are
randomly chosen, we then define the advantage of the adversary in solving the
VoCDH with at most q, q1 queries to the group operation oracles O,O1 and qê
queries to the bilinear pairing oracle Oê : ε1 × ε1 → ε2 as
AdvV oCDHA (λ) = Pr[A(ε1(1), ε1(a), ε1(b), ε1(a−1))
= ε1(a · b)] ≤
4(q + q1 + qê + 4)
2
p
Proof. Let S be the simulator to simulate the entire game for A. S maintains
two polynomial sized dynamic lists: L1 = {(pi, ε1,i)}, L2 = {(qi, ε2,i)}, the pi ∈
Fp[X1, X2] are 2-variate polynomials over Fp, such that p0 = 1, p1 = X1, p2 =
X2, p3 = X
p−2
1 , and {ε1,i}3i=0 ∈R {0, 1}∗ are corresponding arbitrary strings, S
then sets those pairs (pi, ε1,i) as L1. Therefore, the two lists are initialised as
L1 = {(pi, ε1,i)}3i=0, L2 = ∅.
At the beginning of the game, S sends {ε1,i}i=0,··· ,3 to A. After this, S
simulates the group operation oracle O,O1 and the bilinear pairing oracle Oê as
follows. We assume that all requested operands are obtained from S.
– O: The group operation involves two operands ε1,i, ε1,j . Based on these
operands, S searches the list L1 for the corresponding polynomials pi and
pj . Then S perform the polynomial addition or subtraction pl = pi ± pj de-
pending on whether multiplication or division is requested. If pl is in the list
L1, then S returns the corresponding εl to A. Otherwise, S uniformly chooses
ε1,l ∈R {0, 1}∗, where ε1,l is unique in the encoding string L1, and appends
the pair (pl, ε1,l) into the list L1. Finally, S returns ε1,l to A as the answer.
Group operation queries in G1 (i.e., O1) is treated similarly.
– Oê: The group operation involves two operands ε1,i, ε1,j . Based on these
operands, S searches the list L1 for the corresponding polynomials pi and
pj . Then S perform the polynomial multiplication pl = pi · pj . If pl is in the
list L2, then S returns the corresponding ε2,l to A. Otherwise, S uniformly
chooses ε2,l ∈R {0, 1}∗, where ε2,l is unique in the encoding string L2, and
appends the pair (pl, ε2,l) into the list L2. Finally, S returns ε2,l to A as the
answer.
After querying at most q, q1, qe times of corresponding oracles, A terminates
and outputs ε1(x1 · x2). At this point, S chooses random a, b ∈R Fp and sets
X1 = a,X2 = b. The simulation by S is perfect unless the abort event happens.
Thus, we bound the probability of event abort by analyzing the following cases:
1. pi(a, b) = pj(a, b): Since pi 6= pj as the method of L1 is generated, pi − pj
is a non-zero polynomial of degree 0, 1, or p− 2 where p− 2 is produced by
Xp−21 . Since X1 ·X
p−2
1 = X
p−1
1 ≡ 1 (mod p), we have X1(pi−pj) is a non-zero
polynomial of degree 0, 1, or 2. Therefore, the maximum degree of X1(pi−pj)
is 2. By using lemma 1 in [23], we have Pr[(X1(pi − pj))(a, b) = 0] ≤ 2p and
thus Pr[pi(a, b) = pj(a, b)] ≤ 2p . As there are
(
q+4
2
)
pairs of (pi, pj), we have
the abort probability is Pr[abort1] ≤
(
q+4
2
)
· 2p .
2. qi(a, b) = qj(a, b): Since qi 6= qj as the method of L2 is generated and qi, qj
are in the form of
∑
ak,lpkpj for some constants ak,l, qi − qj is a non-zero
polynomial of degree 0, 1, 2, p−1, p−2, or 2p−4. Similar to above case, we have
X21 ·X
p−1
1 ≡ X21 , X21 ·X
p−2
1 ≡ X1, and X21 ·X
2p−4
1 = (X
p−1
1 )
2 ≡ 1 (mod p).
Therefore, X21 (qi−qj) is a non-zero polynomial of degree ranging from 0 to 4.
Since the maximum degree of X21 (qi−qj) is 4, we have Pr[(X21 (qi−qj))(a, b) =
0] ≤ 4p and thus Pr[qi(a, b) = qj(a, b)] ≤
4
p . As there are
(
q1+qê
2
)
pairs of
(qi, qj), we have the abort probability is Pr[abort2] ≤
(
q1+qê
2
)
· 4p .
3. pi(a, b) = ab: Since the degree of p1 is 0, 1, or p− 2, and the degree of X1X2
is 2, we have that pi −X1X2 is a non-zero polynomial of degree 2 or p − 2.
Similar to the case 1, we have X1(pi − X1X2) is a non-zero polynomial of
maximum degree of 3. Therefore, we have Pr[(X1(pi−X1X2))(a, b) = 0] ≤ 3p
and thus Pr[pi(a, b) = ab] ≤ 3p . As there are q+ 4 polynomials in L1, we have
the abort probability is Pr[abort3] ≤ 3(q+4)p .
By combining all above cases, we have the abort probability is
Pr[abort] = Pr[abort1] + Pr[abort2] + Pr[abort3]
≤
(
q + 4
2
)
· 2
p
+
(
q1 + qê
2
)
· 4
p
+
3(q + 4)
p
<
(q + 4)2 + 2(q1 + qê)
2 + 3(q + 4)
p
<
4(q + q1 + qê + 4)
2
p
3.3 Modified Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
Definition 5. Variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Problem: Given g, ga, gb, hc, hd, h1/d ∈ G where a, b, c, d ∈R Zq and h = ge, we
define the advantage of the adversary in solving the VoDCBDH problem as
AdvVoDCBDHA (λ) = Pr[w = A(g, ga, gb, gec, ged, ge/d,
T0, T1, w ∈R {0, 1}) : Tw = gab+ecd, Tw−1 = Z].
The VoDCBDH problem is a variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Problem [27]. We prove the VoDCBDH problem is hard in G with a
bilinear map ê : G×G→ G1 in the generic bilinear group model [23, 9].
Theorem 2. The lower bound of the complexity of the VoDCBDH problem is
stated as follows, querying the group operations and bilinear pairing operations
at most q times.
AdvVoDCBDHA (λ) ≤
3(q + 9)2
p
.
To prove this theorem, we introduce an intermediate problem (see Lemma 2),
and we prove that the hardness of intermediate problem implies the hardness
of the VoDCBDH problem. After that, we prove the intermediate problem is
intractable (see Lemma 1) and then the theorem follows.
Definition 6. Given g, gd, gcd, gd
2
, ge, gae, gbe ∈ G where a, b, c, d, e ∈R Zp and
g ∈R G, the modified problem is to distinguish gabe+cd
2
from a random element
Z ∈R G. The advantage of an adversary A to solve the modified problem is
defined as
Adv
Modified
A (λ) = Pr[w = A(g, g
d, gcd, gd
2
, ge, gae, gbe,
T0, T1, w ∈R {0, 1}) : Tw = gabe+cd
2
, Tw−1 = Z]
Lemma 1. If an algorithm A can solve the VoDCBDH problem with the ad-
vantage AdvVoDCBDHA (λ), then we can built an algorithm S to solve the modified
problem with the advantage AdvModifiedS (λ) such that
AdvVoDCBDHA (λ) ≤ Adv
Modified
S (λ).
Proof. The simulator S obtains an instance θ̂ = (ĝ, ĝd̂, ĝĉd̂, ĝd̂2 , ĝê, ĝâê, ĝb̂ê, T0, T1).
Then S checks whether ĝd̂ = 1 or not. If ĝd̂ = 1, that is d̂ = 0, the simulator
S returns w = 0 if e(ĝâê, ĝb̂ê) = e(T0, ĝê) or returns w = 1 otherwise, and
solves θ̂ with the probability of 1. If ĝd̂ 6= 1, the simulator S continues and sets
θ = (g, ga, gb, h, hc, hd, h
1
d , T0, T1) = (ĝ
ê, ĝâê, ĝb̂ê, ĝd̂, ĝĉd̂, ĝd̂
2
, ĝ, T0, T1), it implic-
itly sets g = ĝê, h = ĝd̂, a = â, b = b̂, c = ĉ, and d = d̂. After that, S sends θ
to A. At some point, the adversary A outputs a bit w, indicating Tw = gabhcd.
Since Tw = g
abhcd = (ĝê)âb̂(ĝd̂)ĉd̂ = ĝâb̂ê+ĉd̂
2
, the simulator S wins with the
probability AdvVoDCBDHA (λ). Therefore, we have
AdvModifiedS (λ) ≥ Pr[ĝd̂ = 1] + Pr[ĝd̂ 6= 1] · AdvVoDCBDHA (λ)
≥ 1
p
+
p− 1
p
AdvVoDCBDHA (λ) ≥ AdvVoDCBDHA (λ).
Lemma 2. The lower bound of the complexity of the modified problem is stated
as follows, querying the group operations and bilinear pairing operations at most
q times.
Adv
Modified
S (λ) ≤
3(q + 9)2
p
.
Proof. The modified problem is an instance of Decisional Bilinear (P, f)-Diffie-
Hellman problem family [27] where P = (p1, . . . , p7) = (1, d, cd, d
2, e, ae, be) and
f = abe+ cd2. We show that f is not dependent on P by contradiction.
Assume f is dependent on P that by definition in [27] there exists 57 con-
stants ai,j , bk, and c that
Q = cf2 +
7∑
k=1
bkpkf +
7∑
i=1
7∑
j=1
ai,jpipj = 0
where at least one of bk or c is non-zero. We analyze the above equation in two
cases.
1. c 6= 0: In this case, there is a term f2 = a2b2e2 + 2abcd2e + c2d4 in Q.
Furthermore, the term a2b2e2 is not in any combination of pkf or pipj , then
f2 cannot be canceled out. Hence, we have Q 6= 0 if c 6= 0.
2. c = 0: In this case, we have Q = cf2 +
∑7
k=1 bkpkf +
∑7
i=1
∑7
j=1 ai,jpipj
where at least one of bk is non-zero. In other words, Q has at least a term
pkf = pk(abe + cd
2) = pkabe + pkcd
2. As Q = 0, both two terms pkabe and
pkcd
2 should be canceled out. In the first step, we focus on the term pkabe.
There are two methods to cancel the term pkabe.
(a) To cancel with pk′f = pkabe + pk′cd
2 where k 6= k′, we have pkabe =
pk′cd
2, that is, pk = θcd
2 and pk′ = θabe for some polynomial θ. Since
no such pair of pk and pk′ in P , we cannot cancel pkabe via pk′f .
(b) To cancel with pipj , we have pkabe = pipj . By observing P , the only
polynomial which has a is p6 = ae. Thus we have pkabe = p6pj ⇐⇒
pkb = pj . By observing P again, the only polynomial which has b is
p7 = be. Thus we have pk = e = p5.
Therefore, pkabe can be canceled out when k = 5. To further cancel out
p5f , the term p5cd
2 = cd2e has to be canceled out. As before, there are two
methods to cancel the term cd2e.
(a) To cancel with pkf = pkabe+ pkcd
2 where k 6= 5, we have pkabe = cd2e.
Since the term cd
2
ab is not in P , we cannot cancel out the term cd
2e.
(b) To cancel with pipj , we have pipj = cd
2e. By observing P , the only
polynomial, which has c is p3 = cd. Thus we have pip3 = cd
2e ⇐⇒
pi = de. Since the term de is not in P , we cannot cancel out the term
cd2e.
Since it is impossible to cancel out any term pkf , we have Q 6= 0 if c = 0.
To sum up, it is impossible to make Q = 0, which contradicts the assumption.
Therefore, we have f is not dependent on P . By the theorem 1 in [27], we directly
have the lemma.
By combining the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have
AdvVoDCBDHA (λ) ≤ AdvModifiedS (λ) ≤
3(q + 9)2
p
.
3.4 Extended Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Problem
We propose an extension of variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Problem below.
Definition 7. Extended variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (EVoDCBDH) Assumption: Given g, ga, gb, ge, gf , hc, hd, h1/d, hl ∈
G where a, b, c, d, e, f, l ∈R Zq and h = ge, we define the advantage of the adver-
sary in solving the EVoDCBDH problem as
AdvEVoDCBDHA (λ) = Pr[w = A(g, ga, gb, gf , hc, hd, h1/d,
hl, T0, T1, w ∈R {0, 1}) : Tw = gab+ecd, Tw−1 = gbf+edl]
Theorem 3. We say a EVoDCBDH assumption holds in group G if for any
PPT A, AdvA(λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Proof. Let S denote the VoDCBDH problem solver, who is given (ga, gb, ge,
gf , hc, hd, h1/d, hl), and aims to distinguish T = gab · hcd from another value
gbf · hdl. S simulates the game for A as follows.
– Setup: S chooses f, l ∈R Zq and computes gf , hl, then generates other public
parameters using the given instances and sends them to A. S also tosses a
random coin w which will be used later in the game.
– Challenge stage: S returns the challenge T if b = 0; Otherwise, returns the
value gbf · hdl to A. Note that the value T comes from his own challenger.
Finally, A outputs w′ as its guess for w. If w′ = w, then S outputs 1; Other-
wise, S outputs 0.
Probability analysis: Since the value T from its challenger can be either gab·hcd
or R, thus we have
AdvV oDCBDHS = Pr[A → 1 | T = gab · hcd]− Pr[A → 1 | T = R]
= [AdvEV oDCBDHA + 1/2]− [AdvV oDCBDHS + 1/2]
= AdvEV oDCBDHA − AdvV oDCBDHS
⇒ AdvEV oDCBDHA = 2 · AdvV oDCBDHS .
3.5 Exponent Challenge Response Signature
We firstly review the Exponent Challenge-Response signature, which will be used
in our k-ASH protocol.
Definition 8. The Exponential Challenge-Response (XCR) signature
scheme [20]. The signer possess a public/secret key pair (ga, a) (a ∈ Zq). A
verifier provides a message m together with a challenge gw
′
(w′ ∈ Zq is chosen
by verifier). The signature produced by signer using challenge gw
′
is defined as
(gw, gw
′(w+a·H(gw||m))) (w ∈ Zq is chosen by signer). Then the verifier accepts a
signature pair (gw, σ) as valid iff gw 6= 0 and σ = (gw · ga·H(gw||m))w′ .
3.6 Our k-ASH protocol
Now we present our proposed unlinkable secret handshake with k-time authen-
tication protocol in the two party setting (without loss of generality, we use user
Â and user B̂ here). It works as follows:
– Setup: TA takes the security parameter λ and the number of handshakes k as
input, outputs the master public key mpk = (g, h, {gti}i=ki=1 , hα, h1/α), and the
master secret key msk = ({ti}i=ki=1 , α). TA also generates four hash functions
H1 : G × G1 → Zq, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq, H3 : G → Zq, H4 : G → Zq and denotes
the bilinear pairing ê : G×G→ G1.
– KeyGen: User Â chooses xa ∈ Zq and computes gxa as his/her public key.
– Register: User Â submits his/her public key gxa to TA. TA then chooses wai ∈
Zq and computes sai = wai +α ·H1(hwai ||ê(gxa , hα)ti) and returns a credential
set {hwai}i=ki=1 , {sai}i=ki=1 to user Â. While user Â can verify them using the
following equations: {hsai ?=hwai · hα·H1(h
wai ||ê(hα,gti )xa )}i=ki=1 .
– Handshake:
Â B̂
Ra−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Rb, g
ti , hwbi , Cbi , Ĉbi , eb←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
gti , hwai , Cai , Ĉai , ea−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1. Handshake
• User Â chooses the ephemeral secret key ra ∈R Zq, computes Ra = hr
′
a =
hH2(ra||xa||sai ) and sends it to user B̂;
• User B̂ performs the following.
∗ Choose the ephemeral secret key rb ∈R Zq, computes Rb = hr
′
b =
hH2(rb||xb||sbi );
∗ Compute Cbi = ê(hα, gti)xb ;
∗ Compute Ĉbi = gti·xb · hsbi ·eb/α, where eb = H3(R
r′b
a );
∗ Send Rb, gti , hwbi , Cbi , Ĉbi , eb to user Â.
• User Â receives the incoming message from user B̂, then performs the fol-
lowing.
∗ Verify ea = H3(R
r′a
b )
?
=eb. If verification fails, reject the session; Otherwise,
proceeds;
∗ Verify ê(Ĉbi , hα)
?
=Cbi · ê(hwbi · hα·ebi , hea), where ebi = H1(hwbi ||Cbi). If
verification fails, reject the session; Otherwise, proceed to the next step;
∗ Compute the session key K = H4((hsbi ·e
∗
b ·Rb)s
∗
a), where e∗b = H3(Rb||ebi),
s∗a = sai · e∗a + r′a, e∗a = H3(Ra||eai), eai = H1(hwai ||Cai);
∗ Send gti , hwai , Cai , Ĉai , ea to user B̂. Note that the computation of Cai , Ĉai
by user Â follows the same procedures as above.
• User B̂ verifies the received message using the same method as user Â, and
computes the session key K = H4((h
sai ·e
∗
a ·Ra)s
∗
b ), where e∗a = H3(Ra||eai),
s∗b = sbi · e∗b + r′b, e∗b = H3(Rb||ebi).
Note that the computation of session key used the XCR signature from [20].
– Tracing
If user Â used the same credential twice, e.g., (Ĉai , eai) and (Ĉ
′
ai , e
′
ai), then
anyone can compute gti·xa = [(gti·xa · hsai ·eai/α)e
′
ai/
(gti·xa · hsai ·e
′
ai
/α)eai ]1/(e
′
ai
−eai ), where eai = H3(R
ra), e′ai = H3(R
′ra). That
means if user Â reused a credential, then user Â’ identity can be revealed
since ê(gti·xa , g) = ê(gti , gxa) for public key gxa .
4 Security Analysis
4.1 Session Key Security
Theorem 4. The proposed k-ASH protocol achieves session key security (Def-
inition 1) in the random oracle model if the VoCDH assumption is held in the
underlying group G.
Proof. We define a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, · · · , 3 and let Advk−ASHi denote
the advantage of the adversary in game Gi. Assume that A activates at most m
(perhaps m ≥ k) sessions in each game.
– G0 This is original game for session key security.
– G1 This game is identical to game G0 except that S will output a random bit
if the nonce Ri is used twice by two different instance oracles. Therefore, we
have: ∣∣Advk−ASH0 − Advk−ASH1 ∣∣ ≤ m2/2λ (3)
– G2 This game is identical to game G1 except that S will output a ran-
dom bit if Forge event happens where A made a send query in the form
of (hr0 , gti , hw0 , ê(hα, gti)xi , gti·xi · hs0·H3(R∗r0 )/α, H3(R∗·r0)) and an H4 query
with a valid forgery σ = R∗s
∗
0 = R∗[s0·H3(h
r0 ||H1(hw0 ||ê(hα,gti )xi ))+r0] for chal-
lenge R∗, such that user i is not corrupted (i.e., no Long term secret key reveal
query to user i or Master secret key reveal query to TA) when the hash query
is made. Then we have:∣∣Advk−ASH1 − Advk−ASH2 ∣∣ ≤ Pr[Forge] (4)
Lemma 3. The Forge event happens only with a negligible probability when
the VoCDH assumption is held in G.
Let S denote the VoCDH problem solver, who is given ha, h1/a, hb, and aims
to compute hab. S simulates the game for A as follows:
• Setup stage: F sets up the game for A by creating n users (set U) with
the corresponding public/secret key pairs {Xi, xi}ni=1. F randomly selects
an index i and guesses that the Forge event will happen with regard to
user i and session i. S then sets the mpk as hα = ha, h1/α = h1/a and
generates other public parameters honestly. In addition, S sets the challenge
as R∗ = hb in the guessed session i, S simulates the game for A as follows.
• S answers A’s queries as follows:
∗ If A issues establish query in the form of (U ′, X ′), such that U ′ /∈ U , then
user U ′ with public key X ′ will be added to the system.
∗ If A issues a send query in the form of (hr′ , gti , hw′ , ê(ha, gti)x′ , gti·x′ ·
h(s
′·e′)/a) to user i, then S verifies it successfully (notice that A may
corrupt a user with secret key x′ and secret signature pair (hw
′
, s′)), and
next to generating the signatures (hwi , si) as follows:
1. Chooses si, ei ∈R Zq;
2. Sets hwi = hsi/ha·ei ;
3. Sets H1(h
wi ||Ci) = ei, where Ci = ê(ha, gti)xi .
Then, S chooses r′i ∈ Zq and computes e = H3(hr
′·r′i). Eventually, S
generates the message (hr
′
i , gti , hwi , Ci, g
ti·xi · h(si·e)/a, e) and sends it to
A.
∗ If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal query to instance oracle ΠiUi ,
then S returns the ephemeral value ri (r′i = H2(ri||xi||si)) to A.
∗ If A issues a long term secret key reveal query to user j (6= i), then S
returns xj and secret signatures {sj}kj=1 to A. Note that S can simulate
secret signatures (hwj , sj) of user j (6= i) using the same method that
described above. If A issues a long term secret key reveal key query to
user i or a master secret key reveal key query to TA, then abort.
∗ Session key reveal query and Test query: S answers the session key reveal
query and the test query by using the session key it has derived during
the protocol simulation described above.
• When Forge event occurs (i.e., A outputs: hr0 , gti , hw0 , ê(ha, gti)xi ,
gti·xi · h(s0·H3(hb·r0 ))/a, H3(hb·r0)), S checks whether:
1. The Forge event with respect to user i on challenge hb;
2. Verifies:
ê(gti·xi · h(s0·H3(h
b·r0 ))/a, ha)
?
= ê(ha, gti)xi · ê(hs0 , he
∗
)
Note that hs0 = hw0 · ha·e1 , s0 = w0 + a · e1, e1 = H1(hw0 ||ê(ha, gti)xi),
e∗ = H3(h
b·r0).
3. Verifies:
ê(D,h) = ê((hsi·H3(h
b||ei) · hb)s0·H3(h
r0 ||e1)+r0 , h)
?
= ê(hsi·H3(h
b||ei) · hb, hs0·e0 · hr0)
Note that the value D is used to compute session key K(= H4(D)),
e0 = H3(h
r0 ||e1).
If all the above conditions hold, S confirms it as a successful forgery from
H4 and proceeds:
σ1 =
D
(hs0·e0 · hr0)si·H3(hb||ei)
= (hb)s0·e0+r0 = hb[(w0+a·e1)e0+r0]
According to the forking lemma [4], by rewinding the adversary twice, S
would obtain four forgeries from H4, which will be listed below.
σ1 = h
b[(w0+a·e1)e0+r0], e0 = H3(h
r0 ||e1);
σ2 = h
b[(w0+a·e1)e′0+r0], e′0 = H3(h
r0 ||e1);
σ3 = h
b[(w0+a·e′1)ê0+r
′
0], ê0 = H3(h
r′0 ||e′1);
σ4 = h
b[(w0+a·e′1)ê′0+r
′
0], ê′0 = H3(h
r′0 ||e′1);
Therefore, S can perform the computation below to obtain a solution to
VoCDH.
D1 = (
σ1
σ2
)1/(e0−e
′
0) = hb·w0 · hab·e1
D2 = (
σ3
σ4
)1/(ê0−ê
′
0) = hb·w0 · hab·e
′
1
hab = (
D1
D2
)1/(e1−e
′
1).
The simulation performed by S is perfect. Since at most n users and m sessions
in the game, we have:
Pr[Forge] ≤ n ·m · AdvV oCDHS (λ) (5)
– G3: This game is identical to game G2 except that in the test session, we
replace the session key K = H4(h
s∗i ·s
∗
j ) by a random value r ∈ Zq. Since we
model H4 as a random oracle, if the event Forge does not happen, then we
have
Advk−ASH2 = Adv
k−ASH
3 (6)
It is easy to see that in game G3, A has no advantage, i.e.,
Advk−ASH3 = 0 (7)
Combining the above results together, we have
Advk−ASHA (λ) ≤ m
2/2λ + n ·m · AdvV oCDHA (λ)
4.2 Anonymity
Theorem 5. The proposed k-ASH protocol achieves anonymity (Definition 2) in
the random oracle model if the EVoDCBDH Assumption is held in the underlying
group G.
Proof. Let S denote a EVoDCBDH problem distinguisher, who is given (g, h, ga,
gb, gf , hc, hd, H1/d, hl), and aims to distinguish gab ·hcd and gbf ·hdl. S simulates
the game for A as follows.
– Setup: S sets up the game for A by creating n users. S sets hα = h1/d, h1/α =
hd (the msk = (α, 1/α) are implicitly set as (1/d, d) respectively), and ran-
domly selects one tag base gt
∗
= gb and generates other tag bases honestly
(i.e., gti , ti ∈ Zq is chosen by S). In addition, S randomly chooses users i, j
from user set U and sets gxi = ga, gxj = gf (the secret keys (xi, xj) are implic-
itly set as (a, f) respectively), and generates public/secret key pair for other
users honestly.
– If A issues a send query in the form of (R′, gti , hw′ , Cb′ , Ĉb′) to user i, then S
performs the simulation as follows.
• S simulates the signature pair (hwi , si) using the same method that de-
scribed in Lemma 3;
• S computes Ĉi = ga·ti · hd·si·e
′
i , and Ci = ê(h
1/d, ga)ti , where e′i = H3(R
′ri),
ri ∈ Zq;
• S generates Ri = hri and sets ei = H1(hwi ||Ci);
• S returns (Ri, gti , hwi , Ci, Ĉi, e′i) to user A as the response.
Note that S can simulate the response of user j using the same method as
above.
– It is easy to see that all queries to other users can be simulated perfectly
using the user secret keys, and S can simulate secret credentials using the
same method as described in Lemma 3.
– Challenge: If A issues a send query in the form of (R, gti , hw′ , C ′i, Ĉ ′i) to user i,
then S computes Ĉi = (gba ·hdc)e
∗
and Ci = ê(Ĉi, h
1/d)/ê(hc, he
∗
), where e∗ =
H3(R
r∗). Eventually, S returns (R∗, gb, hwi , Ci, Ĉi, e∗) to A as the response.
Similarly, if A issues a send query to user j, then S computes Ĉj = (gbf ·
hdl)e
∗
and Cj = ê(Ĉj , h
1/d)/ê(hl, he
∗
), where e∗ = H3(R
r∗). Eventually, S
returns (R∗, gb, hwj , Cj , Ĉj , e
∗) to A as the response. Note that S can perfectly
simulate the value hwi = hc/hei/d, and sets ei = H1(h
wi ||Ci) for user i, S also
can simulate the value hwj of user j using the same method.
Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs. If A guesses the random bit correctly,
then S can break the EVoDCBDH problem. Hence, we have
Advk−ASHA ≤ Adv
EV oDCBDH
S (λ) (8)
5 Extension
We can extend the above k-time ASH protocol in the two party setting to the
multiple party setting using the classic BD broadcasting protocol [10]. The Setup,
KeyGen, Register and Tracing algorithms are same as the two party setting, except
the Handshake algorithm, which will be described below. Note that we suppose
at most n users in the multiple party setting.
– Round 1: User i computes Ri = h
r′i = hH2(ri||xi||si), ri ∈R Zq and broad-
casts (Ri, g
ti , hwi , Ci). Note that xi, si denote the secret key and the secret
credential value of user i, and Ci = ê(h
α, gti)xi . Also notice that the indices
are taken module n so that user 0 is user n and user i+1 is user 1.
– Round 2: After receiving n-1 messages in Round 1, then user i computes
{Ĉj = gti·xi ·hsi·ej/α, ej = H3(R
r′i
j )}
n−1
j=1,j 6=i and {hsj = hwj ·hα·H1(h
wj ||Cj)}n−1j=1,j 6=i.
Eventually, user i computes the intermediate key Ki =
H4(h
s∗i+1·s
∗
i )
H4(h
s∗i−1·s∗i )
and
broadcasts (Ki, {Ĉj , ej}n−1j=1,j 6=i).
Note that s∗i = si · e∗i + r′i, e∗i = H3(Ri||H1(hwi ||Ci)),
hs
∗
i+1 = (hwi+1 ·hα·H1(hwi+1 ||Ci+1))e
∗
i+1 ·Ri+1, e∗i+1 = H3(Ri+1||H1(hwi+1 ||Ci+1)),
hs
∗
i−1 = (hwi−1 ·hα·H1(hwi−1 ||Ci−1))e
∗
i−1 ·Ri−1, e∗i−1 = H3(Ri−1||H1(hwi−1 ||Ci−1)).
– Key Derivation: User i verifies the received messages {Ĉj}j 6=i from n-1
users (it supports batch verification, see below), if either of them fail, then
abort; Otherwise, computes the final session key ski = H4(h
s∗i−1·s
∗
i )n⊕Kn−1i ⊕
Kn−2i+1 · · · ⊕Ki−2).
1. Batch Verification. User i is able to batch verify the received n-1 messages
from n-1 users using the small exponents test in [3, 13].
ê(
n−1∏
j=1
Ĉj
δj
, hα) = ê(
n−1∏
j=1
gti·xj ·δj · hsj ·ej ·δj/α, hα)
=
n−1∏
j=1
ê(gti·xj ·δj , hα) · ê(
n−1∏
j=1
hsj ·ej ·δj , h)
?
=
n−1∏
j=1
C
δj
j · ê(
n−1∏
j=1
hsj ·δj , hej ).
Where δj ∈ Zq, ej = H3(R
r′i
j ) and j ∈ [1, j 6= i, · · · , n− 1]. If batch verifica-
tion fail, then abort; Otherwise, proceeds.
2. Correctness Check.
ski = H4(h
s∗i−1·s
∗
i )n ⊕Kn−1i ⊕K
n−2
i+1 · · · ⊕Ki−2
= H4(h
s∗i−1·s
∗
i )n ⊕ H4(h
s∗i+1·s
∗
i )n−1
H4(h
s∗i−1·s∗i )n−1
⊕ H4(h
s∗i+2·s
∗
i+1)n−2
H4(h
s∗i ·s∗i+1)n−2
· · · ⊕ H4(h
s∗i−1·s
∗
i−2)
H4((h
s∗i−3·s∗i−2)
= H4(h
s∗i−1·s
∗
i )⊕ H4((hs
∗
i ·s
∗
i+1) · · · ⊕ H4((hs
∗
i−2⊕s
∗
i−1).
It is easy to see that all users compute the same key.
The k-time ASH protocol in the multiple party setting also achieved session key
security, anonymity and public traceability. In particular, the security analysis
(including session key security and anonymity) in the two party setting can be
extended to the multiple party setting.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a k-time authenticated secret handshake protocol
based on the k-time tag bases and anonymized Schnorr signature. We also de-
fined the formal security models for session key security and (full) anonymity,
and proved the security of the proposed k-ASK protocol under our proposed
complexity assumptions which have been proved hard in the generic bilinear
group model.
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